

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CIVIL AVIATION TECHNICAL CENTRE, OPP. SAFDARJUNG AIRPORT, NEW DELHI – 110 003

CIVIL AVIATION REQUIREMENTS SECTION 4 – AERODROMES SERIES ' X' PART I 8th JANUARY 2010

EFFECTIVE : FORTHWITH

Subject : Runway Safety Programme and formation of Runway Safety Teams.

1. Background

With the growth in traffic runway incursions have been showing a growing trend the world over, and have been causing safety concerns. Prevention of runway incursions has become a priority area. Runway incursions have sometimes led to serious accidents with significant loss of life. Although it is not a new problem, with the predicted growth of air traffic, the actual numbers of incidents are likely to rise, unless held in check by preventative actions.

Aviation safety programmes have a common goal – to reduce hazards, mitigate and manage residual risk in air transportation, which are the essential components of Safety Management System as recommended by ICAO in the field of Aircraft Operations, Air Traffic Service and Aerodrome Operations. Runway operations, which are vital part of activity at an airport; the hazards and risks associated with it; therefore, needs to be managed in order to prevent runway incursions that may lead to accidents.

The Air Navigation Conference of ICAO, which closely examined runway incursion prevention, in its eleventh meeting held in September – October 2003 in Montreal, Canada, recommended that States take appropriate actions to improve runway safety worldwide through the implementation of runway safety programmes. It also recommended that when capacity-enhancing procedures at aerodromes are considered, appropriate safety studies should be conducted which would take due consideration of the effect on runway safety.

With the recent growth in air traffic in India and enhancement of capacity at all major airports across the country, it has become vital that runway safety programmes are put in place to prevent runway incursions that may lead to incidents/ accidents.

This CAR is issued in supersession of 'CAR Section 4 Series 'X' Part IV dated 17th October 2007.

This CAR is issued under the powers conferred under Section 5A of the Aircraft Act 1934 and Rule 133A of Aircraft Rules 1937.

2. Applicability

The runway safety programme requires the collaboration of air traffic controllers, pilots, vehicle drivers and aerodromes management, therefore this CAR is applicable to aerodromes operators, air traffic service provider, airlines, aircraft operators or any other group which may have a direct bearing on runway operations.

Aerodrome operator is responsible for establishment of the runway safety team at his licensed aerodrome.

3. Definitions

Hot spot. A location on an aerodrome area with a history or potential risk of collision or runway incursion, and where heightened attention by pilots/ drivers is necessary.

Incident. An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation.

Runway Safety Team. A team comprised of representatives from aerodromes operations, air traffic service providers, airlines or aircraft operators, pilot and air traffic controllers associations and any other group with a direct involvement in runway operations that advise appropriate management on the potential runway issues and recommend mitigation strategies.

Runway incursion. Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface, designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft.

4. **Contributory Factors and Mitigation Measures**

Contributory factors and guidelines for stakeholders to prevent the runway incursion are given in Aeronautical Information Circular 6 of 2006. Additional Material is also available in the ICAO Runway Safety Toolkit and DOC. 9870.

5. Establishment of Runway Safety Team

A runway incursion Prevention programme starts with the establishment of runway safety teams at Individual airports. The requirement for establishing the runway safety team and terms and reference of the team are given below:

- a) Individual aerodrome operator shall establish runway safety teams at each of their aerodromes.
- b) The runway safety team shall comprise of representatives from aerodrome operator, air traffic service provider, airlines or aircraft operators and any other groups with a direct involvement in runway operations. The team shall be headed by the Incharge of the Aerodrome/ Airport Director/ Chief Operating Officer etc. as the case may be.

- c) The runway safety team shall have the terms of reference as given in para 6 of this CAR.
- d) The runway safety teams at each licensed aerodromes used for International Air Transport Services shall be completed by 31st December 2007. For other aerodromes, such teams to be established as part of the licensing procedure and establishment of Safety Management System.
- e) The primary role of a runway safety team shall be:
 - to develop action plan for runway safety;
 - identify potential runway incursion issues; and
 - recommend strategies for hazard removal and mitigation of the individual risk.

Note: These strategies may be developed based on local occurrences or combined with information collected from other sources associated with aviation activities.

f) The team shall meet at least once in three month at aerodromes used for International Air Transport Services and once in six month at other aerodromes. Frequency of meetings may be increased keeping in view of traffic growth due to capacity enhancement.

6. Generic terms of reference for the runway safety team

The generic terms of reference for the runway safety team formed at individual aerodromes shall be:

- a) determining the number, type and, if available, the severity of runway incursions;
- b) considering the outcome of investigation reports in order to establish local hot spots or problem areas at the aerodromes;
- c) working as a cohesive team to better understand the operating difficulties of personnel working in other areas and recommending areas for improvement;
- d) ensuring that the recommendations contained in the Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions (ICAO Doc 9870) / Aeronautical Information Circular 6 of 2006, and applicable on the various aspects of aerodrome operation are implemented;
- e) identifying any local problem areas and suggesting improvements;
- f) conducting a runway safety awareness campaign that focuses on local issues, for example, producing and distributing local hot spot maps or other guidance material as considered necessary; and
- g) regularly reviewing the airfield to ensure its adequacy and compliance with regulatory requirements contained in the Aircraft Rules, Civil Aviation Requirements and other guidance material issued by DGCA from time to time.
- h) Forwarding 'Runway Incursion Initial Report Form' and 'Casual Factors identification Form' (Appendix A & B) to DGCA by the Safety Managers of Aerodrome Operator. Casual Factor identification form to be completed in association with the assistance of Safety Managers (ATM, Airlines, service provider).

7. Objectives of the runway safety team

Once the overall number, type and severity of runway incursions have been determined, the team shall establish goals to improve the safety of runway operations. Examples of possible goals are:

- a) to improve runway safety data collection, analysis and dissemination as required in the SMS;
- b) to check that signage and markings are compliant with CAR Section 4, Series B, Part I and visible to pilots and drivers;
- c) to develop initiatives for improving the standard of communications;
- d) to identify potential new technologies that may reduce the possibility of runway incursion;
- e) to ensure that procedures are compliant with Aircraft Rules, Civil Aviation Requirements and other guidelines issued by DGCA from time to time; and
- f) to initiate local awareness by developing and distributing runway safety education and training material to Air Traffic controllers, pilots, personnel driving vehicles on the air side and personnel working at aerodromes.

8. Action items to be prepared and monitored by the runway safety team

- a) The outcome of the meetings of the runway safety team shall be the development of a plan containing action items for mitigating runway safety deficiencies. The action plan would be aerodrome specific and linked to a runway safety concern, issue or problem at that aerodrome. Action items may include suggested changes to the physical features of, or facilities at the aerodrome; air traffic control procedures; air field access requirements; pilot and vehicle operator awareness; and production of hot spot maps.
- b) Each action item shall have a designated person or organization which is responsible for completing the relevant tasks. There may be more than one person or organization affected by an action item; in such cases head of the safety team, shall co-ordinate with such persons or organizations for the completion of all tasks associated with the action item. A realistic time frame to accomplish the work should also be associated with each action item.
- c) The effectiveness of the implemented and/or completed action items should be assessed periodically. This can be accomplished by comparing the results of the initial analysis and the current runway incursion status. For example, if an action item was to provide training for controllers, pilots or vehicle drivers, the effectiveness of such training should be evaluated by the team. If the analysis shows little or no improvement in the number, type or severity of runway incursions, the team should re-evaluate the implementation of that action item.

- d) Education and awareness material such as newsletters, posters, stickers and other educational information are invaluable tools for reducing the risk of runway incursions. These should be used by the runway safety teams for the guidance and education of controllers, pilots, vehicle drivers and personnel working at the aerodromes.
- e) **Identification of Hot Spots**. Suitable strategies should be implemented to remove the hazard associated with hot spots. When this is not immediately possible, action should be initiated by adopting strategies to manage and mitigate the risk. These strategies may include:
 - i) awareness campaigns;
 - ii) additional visual aids (signs, markings and lighting);
 - iii) use of alternative routings;
 - iv) construction of new taxiways; and
 - v) the mitigation of blind spots in the aerodrome control tower.
- f) Aerodromes charts showing hot spots should be produced by the aerodrome operator, checked regularly for accuracy, revised as needed, distributed locally and published in the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP).

9. Monitoring

The activities of Runway Safety Teams shall be monitored by DGCA. Information on establishment of team and reports of the meetings, mitigating action by the runway safety teams including runway incursion, casual factor identification reports etc. shall be submitted by the aerodrome operators directly to DGCA HQrs (Aerodrome Standard Directorate).

Nasin Fails

(Dr. Nasim Zaidi) Director General of Civil Aviation

Appendix-A

RUNWAY INCURSION INITIAL REPORT FORM

Α	Date/time of incident (in UTC) Report Number:								
				Ì					
	YYYYYM M	1 D L) h	h	т	т	DAY		NIGHT
-									
B	Person submitting the	e report:							
	Name Job Title								
	Telephone								
	Facility/Unit								
	Date/time/place of com	pletion o	of form	1					
С	ICAO Aerodrome De								
C	ICAO Acrouronic De	signator							
D	Surface Condition (Br	aking)							
	Υ.	07							
Е		erson inv	olved	in tl	he ru	inwa	y incursi	on (Indicate	e those involved in the occurence)
	Aircraft 1								
_	Aircraft 2								
	Aircraft 3 Vehicle								
	Person								
	i cisoli								
F	Weather Conditions								
	Wind						Visibilit		
	Temperature (° Celsius						Ceiling/	Cloud	
	Additional Information	:							
C	T	6, 1							
G	Evasive Action Aircra	it I							
	Yes								
	Select from the list bel	ow as a	propr	iate					
	Cancelled take off clear	_		_					
	Cancelled take off clea	lance							
	Rejected takeoff			\square		dist	ance rol	led	
				_					
	Rotated early								
	Delayed rotation								
	Abrupt stop								
	Abrupt stop								
	Swerved								
	Missed approach					Dist	tance to	runway thr	eshold
	Other								
Н	Evasive Action Aircra	ft 2							
11	No	iit 2							
	Yes								
	Select from the list bel	ow as ap	propr	iate					
	Cancelled takeoff clear	ance			1				
	cuncence autom clear				1				
	Rejected takeoff				1	Dist	tance rol	led	
					-				
	Rotated early				1				

	Delayed rotation					
	Abrupt stop					
	Swerved					
	Missed approach		Distance to runway thr	eshold		
	Other					
I	Evasive Action - Vehicle					
	No 🗌					
	Yes Select from the list below as	s annr	onriate			
	Abrupt stop		opriaie			
	Swerve					
	Other					
J	Closest Proximity (CP)		Vertical (ft)	Horizon	tal (m)	
К	Communication Difficulties?					
			• /			
	Yes Select from the list below as	s appr	opriate			
	Read back/hear back					
	Blocked communication					
	Partially blocked communication					
	Confused call signs					
	ACFT/vehicle on wrong frequency/no	radio				
	Non-standard phraseology					
L.	АТС					
	Did the ATC forget about ?			Yes	No	
	An ACFT/person/vehicle cleared onto	or to ci	ross a runway?			
	An ACFT on approach to land?					
	A runway closure?					
М.	Description of Incident and Relevant Circumstances:	t				
	1. A description or diagram of the ge	eometr	y of the incident scenario;			
	Description:					

	Diagram:		
	2. A description of any evasive or co	prrective action taken to avoid a col	lision;
	3 An assessment of the available re	action time and the effectiveness of	the evasive or corrective action;
	4. An indication of whether a review	v of voice communication has been	completed and results of that
	review :		1
	5. Initial assessment of severity.		
N.	Aircraft details- Aircraft - 1		
14.	Anterart uctaris-Anterart - 1		
	Registration No .		
	SSR code (if applicable) Owner/Operator		
	Flight Details (Select from the list below as appropri		
	Type of Flight	Flight Rules	
	General Aviation	IFR	

	Military	VFR
	Non-scheduled	
	Scheduled	
	Other	
	Not applicable	
0.	Aircraft details- Aircraft 2	
	Registration No .	Call sign
	SSR code (if applicable)	Flight No
	Owner/Operator	Aircraft 2 type
	Flight Details (Select from the list below as appropriate)	
	Type of Flight	Flight Rules
	General Aviation	IFR
	Military	VFR
	Non-scheduled	
	Scheduled	
	Other	
	Not applicable	
Р.	Vehicle details –Vehicle 1	
	Registration No	Call sign
	Vehicle-1 type	Owner/Operator
_	Permit No	
	Other details (<i>Select from the list below as appropriate</i>)	Other:
	Runway inspection	
	Bird control	
	Tugging/Towing	
	Fire brigade	
	Maintenance	
	Military	
Q.	Vehicle details –Vehicle 2	
	Registration No	Call sign
	Vehicle-2 type	Owner/Operator :
	Permit No	

		-
	Other details (Select from the list below as appropriate)	Other:
	Runway inspection	
	Bird control	
	Tugging/Towing	
	Fire brigade	
	Maintenance	
	Military	
R.	Report received by	
	Nama of novcon .	
	Name of person :	
	Designation : Organisation :	Date:
S.	Person/Agency responsible for investigation &	
5.	likely date of completion of Investigation.	
	incery date of completion of investigation.	

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE COMPLETION OF RUNWAY INCURSION INITIAL REPORT FORM

Item

- A. Date/time UTC and conditions (day or night).
- B. Details of the person submitting the report.
- C. Aerodrome designator as indicated in *Location Indicators* (Doc 7910).
- D. Information regarding runway condition at the time of the incursion that affected the braking action of the aircraft.
- E. Identification of aircraft, vehicle and person involved in the runway incursion. More details should be provided in N, O, P, and Q.
- F. Information on weather conditions such as wind, visibility, RVR, temperature, ceiling, cloud and additional information as required.
- G, H, I.Information regarding evasive actions taken by aircraft and/or vehicle.
- J. Information regarding the closest proximity (CP) or distance, horizontally and/or vertically, between both parties during the runway incursion or at the point at which both parties were aware of the situation and the aircraft was under control at taxi speed or less.
- K, L. Information regarding communications difficulties and ATC memory lapses.
- M. Describe the runway incursion, provide information requested. Attach additional papers as requested.
- N, O, P, Q. Detailed information regarding aircraft and vehicles involved in the runway incursion.
- R. Details of the Safety Manager receiving the report.
- S. Investigating agency & likely date of completion of Investigation.

Appendix-B

RUNWAY INCURSION CAUSAL FACTORS IDENTIFICATION FORM

Α	Date/time of incident (in UTC)Initial Runway Incursion Report Number				
	YYYYM M D D h h m m				
В	B. Aircraft, vehicle or person involved in the runway incursion (Indicate those involved in the occurance)				
	Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2				
	Aircraft 3				
	Vehicle Person				
С	Severity of Runway Incursion Accident (Select as appropriate)				
	Severity (Tick $$)				
	A _ B _ C _ D _ E _				
D	Causal and Coincident Factors (Multiple choices can be made)				
1.	AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL				
1.1	Communications				
1.1.1	Transmitted instructions which were long, complex, spoken rapidly or not in accordance with ICAO language requirement for air-ground radiotelephony communications (language normally used by the station on the ground or the English language)				
1.1.2	Did not obtain read-backs for clearances, instructions & coordination as required by ICAO				
1.1.3	Did not correct an error in a read-back				
1.1.4	Issued a clearance to the wrong aircraft				
1.1.5	Confused similar call-signs				
1.1.6	Transmission was completely blocked				
1.1.7	Deviation from established ICAO standard phraseologies				
1.1.8	Other (please specify), If not ICAO procedure, briefly describe the procedure used and where.				
1.2	Situational Awareness				

1.2.1 Head down time due to equipment/displays; duties other than traffic processing such as inputting flight data

<u>1.2.2</u> Forgot:

•		
	aircraft on an active runway	
	aircraft cleared to cross a runway	
	• aircraft in the lined up position	
	• aircraft on approach to land	
	• to issue a clearance	
	• that a clearance had already been issued	
	closed runways	
	• a vehicle on an active runway	
	• A vehicle cleared to cross a runway	
1.2.3	Distractions due to:	
	• performing other assigned duties, such as conducting operational telephone calls, weather observations and recording, issuing NOTAM and other operational information	
	 engaging in non-operational activities such as personal telephone call, extraneous conversation, reading material and radios 	
1.2.4	Used a language other than ICAO air-ground radiotelephony communications language requirements (language normally used by the station on the ground or the English language)	
1.2.5	Other (please specify),	
1.2.6	Misidentified the aircraft or the aircrafts position due to:	
	 incorrect position report an incorrect expectation(e.g. expected the aircraft to be clear of the runway) 	
	• an incorrect expectation(e.g. expected the ancian to be clear of the fullway)	
1.2.7	Lack of visual scanning of ground movements	
1.2.8	Limitations on the view of the maneuvering area from ATC tower	
1.2.9	Recent runway configuration change	
1.2.10	Unusual runway configuration	
1.2.11	Error occurred within 15 minutes of assuming the control position	
1.2.12	Controller was conducting on-the-job training	
1.2.13	Fatigue	
1.2.14	Other (please specify).	
1.3	Staffing	
1.3.1	ATC positions were combined on the same frequency	
1.0.1	Are positions were combined on the same nequency	

SERI	ES 'X' PART I	8" January 2010	0
1.3.3	Supervisor was working at a control position		
1.4	Decision Making		
1.4.1	Misjudged separation or anticipated separation		
1.4.2	Inadequate ATC to ATC coordination		
1.4.3	Other (please specify).		
1.5	Procedures		
1.5.1	Misapplication of Conditional clearances		
1.5.2	Use of multiple line up clearances		
1.5.3	Other (please specify). If not ICAO procedure, briefly describe the procedure used	d & where.	
1.6	Aerodrome works		
1.6.1	ATC not advised of works on the manoeuvring area		
1.6.2	Other (please specify).		
2.	FLIGHT CREW		
2.1	Communications		
2.1.1	Transmission was completely blocked		
2.1.2	Transmission was partially-blocked "stepped-on"		
2.1.3	Accepted another aircraft's clearance:		
	• With similar call signs		
	Without similar call signs		
2.1.4	Deviation from established ICAO standard phraseologies		
2.1.5	Used other than ICAO language requirements for air-ground radiotelephony co (language normally used by the station on the ground or the English language) is covered by ICAO standard phraseology		

2.1.6 Used language not in accordance ICAO language requirement for air-ground radiotelephony communications (language normally used by the station on the ground or the English language)*

2.1.7	Speech quality:				
	• Not proficient in ICAO language requirement air-ground radiotelephony communications (language normally used by the on the ground or the English language)				
	Poorly enunciated or heavily accented				
	• Spoken rapidly				
	Spoken with an inconsistent volume				
2.1.8	Did not use headsets				
2.1.9	Received clearance or instructions during periods of high cockpit workload				
2.1.10	Did not advise ATC of a delay on the runway prior to take off				
2.1.11	Other (please specify).				
2.2	Situational Awareness				
2.2.1	Crew conducting checklists while taxiing				
2.2.2	Crew member programming flight management system or other flight deck system while taxiing				
2.2.3	Crew member was on another radio frequency				

2.2.4 Competing radio communications

2.2.5 Unfamiliar with the aerodrome layout

2.2.6 Crew mistook position on the aerodrome (thought they were in a different location)

2.2.8 Reported incorrect location to ATC

2.2.9 Taxied fast

Fatigue

2.2.7

2.2.10 Did not refer to the aerodrome diagram

2.2.11 Did not listen to the ATIS

2.2.12 Works on the manoeuvring area not previously advised by NOTAM

2.2.13 Used out of date or inaccurate publications or charts

2.2.14 Failed to apply or correctly observe Sterile Cockpit procedures

2.2.15 Other (please specify).

2.3	Marking, Signs and Lighting	
2.3.1	Not ICAO/ CAR compliant	
2.3.2	Not provided	
2.3.3	Irregularly spaced	
2.3.4	Ambiguous and difficult to follow	
2.3.5	Poorly sized	
2.3.6	Poorly situated	
2.3.7	Poorly maintained	
2.3.8	Other (please specify).	
2.4	Clearances and Instructions	
2.4.1	Misunderstood clearance: • conditional	
	follow	
	• other	
2.4.2	Flight crew did not ask for clarification when they did not understand clearance or instruction	
2.4.3	Did not inform ATC when could not comply with a clearance	
2.4.4	Forgot part of the clearance or instruction	
2.4.5	Entered the runway after being instructed to "hold short"	
2.4.6	Lined up on the runway after instruction to taxi to the runway holding position (point)	
2.4.7	Took off without a clearance after being instructed to "line up and wait"	
2.4.8	Took off without a clearance after being instructed to taxi to the runway holding position (point)	
2.4.9	Landed or departed on wrong runway	
2.4.10	Landed or departed on taxiway	
2.4.11	Other (please specify).	
3.	VEHICLES AND PEDESTRIANS	
3.1	Communications	
3.1.1	 Not operating on the appropriate: Ground frequency for operations outside the runway strip 	
	 Tower frequency for operations within the runway strip 	

SECTION 4 8th January 2010

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3.1.2	Turned the radio volume down or off after initial communication with ATC	
3.1.3	Other (please specify).	
3.2	Situational Awareness	
3.2.1	Forgot the details/limits of any clearance to operate on the manoeuvring area	
3.2.2	Distracted by:current work	
	high noise levels	
	• monitoring more than one frequency and possibly a mobile telephone	
	disoriented or lost on the aerodrome	
3.2.3	Failure to report correct location	
3.2.4	Other (please specify).	
3.3	Markings, Signs and Lighting	
3.3.1	Not ICAO/CAR compliant	
3.3.2	Not provided	
3.3.3	Irregularly spaced	
3.3.4	Ambiguous and difficult to follow	
3.3.5	Poorly sized	
3.3.6	Poorly situated	
3.3.7	Poorly maintained	
3.3.8	Other (please specify).	
3.4	Procedures	
3.4.1	Not adequately familiar with the aerodrome and its procedural requirements	

3.4.2 Did not refer to current aerodrome NOTAM

- **3.4.3** Did not refer to current aerodrome diagram
- **3.4.4** Used out of date or inaccurate publications or charts
- **3.4.5** Did not advise ATC of work that affected operations

3.4.6 Ground vehicles did not stop at required positions

3.4.7 Other (please specify).

3.5	Clearances and Instructions	5	
3.5.1	Did not comply with ATC cle	earances and instructions	
	r y		
3.5.2	Mistook as theirs, a clearance	intended for another vehicle or an aircraft	
3.5.3	Did not advise ATC that the o	driver did not understand the clearance or instruction	
3.5.4	Other (please specify).		
	o and (preuse speensy).		
E.	Person submitting the form	•	
1.1	i erson submitting the form	•	
		Name:	
		Title:	
	Sign.	1110.	
	Date:	Organisation	
	Date.	Organisation	

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE COMPLETION OF RUNWAY INCURSION CAUSAL FACTORS IDENTIFICATION FORM

ITEM

- A. Date/time in UTC and place where the runway incursion occurred.
- B. Identify the aircraft, vehicle and person involved in the runway incursion.
- C. Classify the severity of the runway incursion according to following **Severity Classification scheme** (*Refer ICAO DOC 9870, Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursion Chapter 6*)

Severity Classification	Description
Α	A serious incident in which a collision is narrowly avoided.
В	An incident in which separation and there is a significant potential for collision which may result in a time critical corrective/evasive response to avoid a collision.
С	An incident characterized by ample time and /or distance to avoid a collision.
D	Incident that meets the definition of runway incursion such as incorrect presence of a single vehicle/person/aircraft on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft but with no immediate safety consequences.
E	Insufficient information inconclusive or conflicting evidence precludes severity assessment.

D Fill all causal and coincident factors applicable to the runway incursion incident.

E. Details of the person submitting the form and date (*Refer para 6- h of the CAR*).

Note : The information provided in the form may be required by ICAO to facilitate global identification of runway incursion casual factor.